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Abstract. Emergency responders often have to operate and
respond to emergency situations during dynamic weather
conditions, including floods. This paper demonstrates a novel
method using existing tools and datasets to evaluate emer-
gency responder accessibility during flood events within the
city of Leicester, UK. Accessibility was quantified using the
8 and 10 min legislative targets for emergency provision for
the ambulance and fire and rescue services respectively un-
der “normal” no-flood conditions, as well as flood scenar-
ios of various magnitudes (1 in 20-year, 1 in 100-year and
1 in 1000-year recurrence intervals), with both surface wa-
ter and fluvial flood conditions considered. Flood restrictions
were processed based on previous hydrodynamic inundation
modelling undertaken and inputted into a Network Analysis
framework as restrictions for surface water and fluvial flood
events. Surface water flooding was shown to cause more dis-
ruption to emergency responders operating within the city
due to its widespread and spatially distributed footprint when
compared to fluvial flood events of comparable magnitude.
Fire and rescue 10 min accessibility was shown to decrease
from 100, 66.5, 39.8 and 26.2 % under the no-flood, 1 in 20-
year, 1 in 100-year and 1 in 1000-year surface water flood
scenarios respectively. Furthermore, total inaccessibility was
shown to increase with flood magnitude from 6.0 % under the
1 in 20-year scenario to 31.0 % under the 1 in 100-year flood
scenario. Additionally, the evolution of emergency service
accessibility throughout a surface water flood event is out-
lined, demonstrating the rapid impact on emergency service
accessibility within the first 15 min of the surface water flood
event, with a reduction in service coverage and overlap being
observed for the ambulance service during a 1 in 100-year
flood event. The study provides evidence to guide strategic
planning for decision makers prior to and during emergency
response to flood events at the city scale. It also provides a
readily transferable method for exploring the impacts of nat-
ural hazards or disruptions in other cities or regions based
on historic, scenario-based events or real-time forecasting, if
such data are available.
1 Introduction
Floods are one of the most significant natural hazards, af-
fecting 116 million people globally, causing approximately
7000 deaths and damages in the region of USD 7.5 billion
annually (UNESCO, 2010). Within the UK, the Environment
Agency (2009) estimated that 5 million people (1/12 of the
UK population) occupying 2 million properties are currently
at risk from coastal, fluvial or surface water (pluvial) flood-
ing. Following the Pitt Review (Pitt, 2008), the Environment
Agency produced UK-wide surface water flood hazard maps
and identified flood “hotspots” at direct flood risk. Although
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
2 D. Green et al.: City-scale accessibility of emergency responders operating during flood events
considerable work has focused on understanding the UK’s
direct flood risk, flooding often has associated indirect or cas-
cading impacts that extend beyond the area experiencing in-
undation. Indirect impacts relate to a series of interconnected
or related infrastructural failures that are initiated by a nat-
ural hazard or disturbance such as a flood event (Pescaroli
and Alexander, 2015). Critical infrastructure, such as util-
ity services, hospitals, emergency service locations (police,
ambulance, and fire and rescue stations), and the transporta-
tion networks that connect these services are also susceptible
to flooding (Douglas et al., 2010; Stålhult and Andersson,
2014). Therefore, inundation may result in spatially diffuse
consequences that are often difficult to measure and are per-
ceived as less important when compared to direct flood im-
pacts (Penning-Rowsell and Parker, 1987; Arkell and Darch,
2006). For example, a flooded electricity substation may re-
sult in thousands of properties outside of the flooded area
losing power. Also, flooded transport infrastructure may af-
fect the transit of vehicles across the network (Gil and Stein-
bach, 2008; Lhomme et al., 2013; Yin et al., 2016), which
is of particular importance to the emergency services (e.g.
fire and rescue, ambulance, police) that may be required to
respond to emergency calls during flood events.
According to the UK Government’s Civil Contingencies
Act (2004), responders operating within a Multi-Agency
Flood Plan (MAFP) are divided into two categories with
separate duties during emergency scenarios. Category 1 re-
sponders, including emergency services, lead local authori-
ties (LLAs) and the Environment Agency are at the core of
a response, while Category 2 organisations, such as utility
and transport services, act as co-operating responders to as-
sist and share information during flood emergencies. In Eng-
land and Wales, Category 1 and 2 responders act individually
or collectively through 42 local resilience forums to respond
to major emergency situations, including those related to se-
vere flooding (Defra, 2014).
Working in a common framework, local responders are
required to make their own decisions about what planning
arrangements are appropriate considering the local circum-
stances and priorities. For flood-related incidents, a MAFP
is required by the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) to out-
line a framework for planning, response and recovery. The
successful implementation of a MAFP requires the key op-
erational and stakeholder organisations (e.g. fire and rescue
service, ambulance service, city council and police) to pro-
vide efficient and functional services during flood conditions
collectively. To a large extent, this depends on the contin-
ued functioning of critical infrastructure nodes and networks
pertinent to flood emergency planning and response, includ-
ing vital services such as fire and rescue stations, hospitals,
telecommunication networks and the transit network (Lum-
broso et al., 2008; Dawson et al., 2011; Lumbroso and Vinet,
2012; Wilby and Keenan, 2012; Bosher, 2014). Currently, de-
cision making during flood events and knowledge of flood-
prone areas is informed by planning exercises coordinated
by emergency responder organisations, local understanding
and past experience of areas prone to flooding, as well as
identification of flood hotspot areas based on flood modelling
studies (see Sect. 2.1). However, these approaches only show
the locations of direct flood risk and cannot be used to un-
derstand the indirect impacts of flooding on emergency re-
sponder operation and accessibility. An applied understand-
ing of the spatio-temporal impacts of flood events on emer-
gency responder accessibility may enhance existing contin-
gency planning frameworks by providing foresight into the
potential bottleneck locations across the city, which may ul-
timately increase emergency responder resilience and pre-
paredness during flood events.
Emergency responders in the UK are required by legisla-
tion to conform to strict time frames in which they must re-
spond to incidents. For example, ambulance and fire and res-
cue services are required to reach 75 % of “Red 1” incidents
in less than 8 and 10 min respectively from when the initial
report was logged. These include incidents that may elicit
high-priority blue-light responses such as cardiac arrest, life-
threatening and/or traumatic injury, road traffic collisions,
and individuals trapped in floodwaters. However, these re-
sponse targets might be unachievable under certain flood sit-
uations that limit the ability of emergency responders to nav-
igate a disrupted road network (Albano et al., 2014).
Gil and Steinbach (2008) evaluated the indirect impact
of flooding on an urban street network, demonstrating the
consequences of localised and larger-scale spatial accessi-
bility during disruptive events. Findings suggested that, al-
though the effects of a specific flood event may be concen-
trated or isolated in one location, other areas may still be
affected. An urban transport network may be able to cope
with small changes of state (i.e. minor flood events where
depths are low and spatial extent is limited). However, more
severe flooding may result in the transport network reaching
a “tipping point” where network routing is considerably im-
pacted (Sakakibaral et al., 2004; Dawson et al., 2011; Albano
et al., 2014). According to Gil and Steinbach (2008), loca-
tions during floods may become (i) “islands”, completely cut
off with no access; (ii) “peninsulas”, with a single critical
access route; (iii) “peripheral areas” that are more difficult
to access or (iv) “refugial areas”, which are still accessible
and play an important role for coordinating and managing
response efforts. These indirect, cascading impacts may be
more detrimental to the functioning of a city than the imme-
diate, directly apparent impacts and may result in substantial
difficulties for road users, including Category 1 emergency
responders, to navigate during flood events.
This paper describes a novel approach to modelling and
evaluating the impacts of surface water and fluvial flood
events of varying magnitudes on emergency responders op-
erating at the city scale using readily available datasets and
functions within a GIS software package (ArcGIS). The city
of Leicester was selected as a case study, with a specific focus
on emergency response mapping of two Category 1 respon-
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ders, namely the Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service and
the East Midlands Ambulance Service.
2 Methodology
2.1 Case study area
Leicestershire, including the city of Leicester, UK, has expe-
rienced a history of localised flooding (Shackley et al., 2001)
with council records indicating that annual fluvial flood dam-
ages amounted to ∼GBP 90 000 between 2000 and 2010
(Climate East Midlands, 2012). In addition, surface water
flooding also poses serious problems to the city of Leices-
ter, with Leicester being ranked 16th out of 4215 settlements
assessed within England in terms of surface water flood risk
(Defra, 2009). The Environment Agency also estimates that
approximately 36 900 properties in Leicester’s principle ur-
ban area occupy flood-prone areas (Leicester City Council,
2012).
Anecdotal information is available on historic flood events
within Leicester although details on specific flood mecha-
nisms, severity and areal extent are largely absent. Based on
the total number of historic incidents collated by Leicester
City Council, the flood events that occurred in July 1968 and
June 1993 appear to be the most severe historical events, with
reports indicating that the July 1968 flood event affected up
to 1800 properties and 28 factories within the city (Leicester
City Council, 2011). More recently (June 2012), Leicester
experienced severe surface water flooding following a short,
intense period of precipitation where∼ 30 mm of rainfall fell
in 20 min, overwhelming the city’s drainage and resulting in
widespread flooding across the city.
Since the Flood & Water Management Act (2010), Leices-
ter City Council has completed a number of flood risk stud-
ies, including a Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment (2011),
Flood Risk & Hazard Mapping Report (2013) and Local
Flood Risk Management Plan (2015). These studies iden-
tified 26 surface water flood hotspots, including the main
hospital, Leicester Royal Infirmary, as well as a number of
densely populated, low-income areas of the city (Fig. 1) and
have been important in informing flood planning and insti-
gating flood management efforts within the city. However,
research has focused largely on the direct impacts of flood-
ing in the city and has not studied the indirect impacts of
flooding, for example, on emergency response and accessi-
bility.
2.2 Data collation
2.2.1 Road network and critical infrastructure
Leicester’s transport network was represented using Ord-
nance Survey Integrated Transport Network (ITN) data,
which, in addition to including detailed road network ge-
ometry and routing information, include metadata that out-
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Figure 1. Distribution of the 26 locations identified as surface water
hotspots in Leicester, UK.
lines standard road restrictions that may inhibit or delay the
traversing of a vehicle across a specific section of road. The
same ITN data are also used in emergency responder con-
trol centres and within emergency vehicles to aid navigation
to incidents (Ordnance Survey, 2008). Restrictions contained
within the ITN included height and weight limits, speed re-
strictions based on national speed limits, mandatory turn re-
strictions (i.e. no right turns) and one-way roads. Although it
is likely that congestion and human behavioural changes may
affect the routing of emergency vehicles during flood events,
the network analysis undertaken did not consider congestion
or the impact of traffic. Although congestion data could be
implemented into the modelling framework based on historic
traffic data (Winn, 2014; Cho and Yoon, 2015), which were
available for the city of Leicester from Leicestershire County
Council, congestion data were not used due to uncertainties
associated with how human behaviour and patterns of con-
gestion may differ under flood conditions when compared to
normal conditions on which the traffic data were based. Fur-
thermore, emergency vehicles are able to bypass the majority
of congestion when responding to incidents that elicit a blue-
light response. Still, because congestion data were not im-
plemented in the modelling conducted, the results presented
demonstrate a “best-case” scenario, ignoring potential delays
associated with other road users.
The Environment Agency National Receptor Database
(NRD) was used to identify critical infrastructure nodes and
vulnerable locations in the study area, including hospitals,
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ambulance stations, and fire and rescue stations. Six fire and
rescue stations (Birstall, Western, Southern, Central, East-
ern and Wigston) and five ambulance and hospital locations
(Goodwood Ambulance Station, Leicester Royal Infirmary,
Gorse Hill Ambulance Station, Narborough Ambulance Sta-
tion and Leicester General Hospital) were identified as points
of origin for modelling emergency response zones.
2.2.2 Flooding scenarios
The impact of surface water and fluvial flooding on Leices-
ter’s emergency response times for ambulance and fire and
rescue were both considered. Existing surface water and flu-
vial inundation datasets associated with flooding of various
magnitudes were obtained directly from the Leicester City
Council and Environment Agency respectively. Fluvial and
surface water flood events with return periods of 1 in 20, 100
and 1000 years were assessed.
High-resolution (1 m horizontal, ±0.25 m vertical), city-
wide surface water inundation depth data derived from a
hydrodynamic inundation model (TUFLOW), conducted as
part of Leicester’s Surface Water Management Plan (2012),
were obtained from the Leicester City Council. This resource
allowed the extraction of spatially referenced flood depth
data at multiple points in time throughout the flood event.
The modelling involved applying spatially uniform precipi-
tation associated with specified return periods, namely 1 in
20, 1 in 100 and 1 in 1000 years, calculated for design storm
hyetographs of 6 h duration (Fig. 2). Distributed roughness
values classified according to Ordnance Survey MasterMap©
land uses (e.g. 0.02 for roads, 0.03 for buildings, 0.04 for
gardens and/or vegetation) were applied in the modelling
process. The modelling included a uniform drainage rate
of 12 mm h−1 to account for drainage and/or infiltration to
natural, permeable surfaces and artificial drainage systems
such as sewers and manholes, as recommended by the En-
vironment Agency (2012). Further information on the sur-
face water inundation modelling used in this study can be
found in Leicester City Council’s Surface Water Manage-
ment Plan (2012).
Fluvial inundation data for the River Soar and associated
tributaries within Leicester were obtained from the Environ-
ment Agency. As flood depths were not available for fluvial
flooding, flood hazard data were used to derive flood restric-
tions. Flood hazard is a function of flood depth (m), velocity
(m s−1) and potential for entrainment of debris within flood-
waters (HR Wallingford, 2006), all factors that could inhibit
vehicle passage. The spatially distributed flood hazard data
were classified into four categories based on the flood hazard
rating calculated using the FD23211 guidance document pro-
posed by HR Wallingford (2006): (i) low – shallow flowing
water or deep, standing water, (ii) moderate – dangerous for
some with deep, fast-flowing water, (iii) significant – danger-
ous for most with deep, fast-flowing water and (iv) extreme
– deep, fast-flowing water that is dangerous to all.
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Figure 2: Design rainfall scenarios for the 1 in 20-, 1 in 100- and 1 in 1,000-year surface water flood modelling 
conducted by Leicester City Council. 
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Figure 2. Design rainfall scenarios for the 1 in 20-, 1 in 100- and
1 in 1000-year surface water flood modelling conducted by the Le-
icester City Council.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Network restrictions
First, flood restrictions were defined using the data detailed
in the previous section. A study by the Automobile Associ-
ation (2014) recommended that regular motorists (i.e. small
or medium cars) should avoid driving through floodwaters
≥ 15 cm depth as this may be sufficient to stall a car or result
in loss of control, while water depths exceeding 30 cm may
be sufficient to move vehicles. Additionally, depths ≥ 15 cm
may conceal submerged hazards (e.g. overflowing drains or
large debris), which could prevent vehicles from success-
fully traversing floodwaters. Despite this, emergency vehi-
cles have a greater tolerance for travelling through floodwa-
ters than standard vehicles.
Semi-structured interviews conducted with Leicestershire
Fire and Rescue Service revealed that water depths of ap-
proximately 25 cm (lower than the wheel arch of the vehicle)
may be traversed during an emergency situation due to the
size, weight and power of emergency vehicles – a fire ap-
pliance weighs approximately 12 T and drivers are trained
to traverse through floodwaters. This threshold depth value
is also consistent with previous research (HR Wallingford,
2006; Dawson et al., 2011; Pregnolato et al., 2016). Although
high velocities may hinder emergency responders from suc-
cessfully traversing floodwaters, modelled flow velocities
were typically < 1 m s−1 due to ponding in topographic hol-
lows. Therefore, depth was selected as the principal factor
when evaluating the sites of network restrictions. Hence, a
threshold water depth of 25 cm was set for the surface water
flood scenarios, with water depths ≥ 25 cm being treated as
restrictions to emergency vehicle flow along a specific road
section.
Surface water flood depths ≥ 25 cm were then processed
to remove additional polygons that did not overlap or inter-
cept with the ITN and would not be used for analyses (i.e. in
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Figure 3. ITN network under (a) normal no-flood conditions and overlain with restrictions under (b) 1 in 20-year, (c) 1 in 100-year and (d) 1
in 1000-year surface water flood scenarios showing the extent of flooding above a 25 cm threshold that intersects the ITN network.
areas that would not affect network routing since their extent
did not extend to the road network). Additionally, network
restrictions were manually inspected to ensure realistic emer-
gency response zone calculation. Processing included the re-
moval of obstructions due to (i) isolated pixels of inunda-
tion less than 10 m2 in area that would likely be traversable
and (ii) artefact-inundated areas over raised transport features
such as bridges and bypasses that may not have been cor-
rectly represented in the DEM. Preprocessing of network re-
strictions used for the surface water flood scenarios improved
computational speed and performance significantly, with the
100-year surface water flood event having 201 065 polygons
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6 D. Green et al.: City-scale accessibility of emergency responders operating during flood events
to treat as restrictions prior to inspection but only 10 557 af-
terwards. Figure 3 illustrates the no-flood restriction trans-
port network as well as the transport network with overlain
surface water flood depths greater than 25 cm under the three
flood magnitude scenarios: 1 in 20 years, 1 in 100 years and
1 in 1000 years.
To create fluvial inundation restrictions, all fluvial flood
hazard categories with the exception of the “low” flood haz-
ard category were treated as barriers and restrictions in all
return period scenarios. Low flood hazard polygons were re-
moved as restrictions because it was reasonable to assume
that emergency vehicles would be able to traverse floodwa-
ters in this category (Sect. 2.2.2). Category 1 responders sug-
gested that emergency vehicles could have some issues pass-
ing through floodwaters in the “moderate” flood hazard cat-
egories and above, especially due to the possibility of sub-
merged obstacles. Therefore, flood hazard ratings of moder-
ate and above were treated as restrictions within the mod-
elling. Figure 4 highlights the flood hazard data used to cre-
ate restrictions for fluvial inundation under the 1 in 20-, 1 in
100- and 1 in 1000-year flood scenarios.
2.3.2 Network routing
To quantify accessibility and evaluate service coverage,
quickest routing (based on time taken to travel between two
points when traversing the Integrated Transport Network), as
opposed to shortest-path routing (based on the distance be-
tween two points), was selected since this algorithm consid-
ers road restrictions and impedances. Quickest routing be-
tween facility and destination was based on Dijkstra’s (1959)
shortest-path algorithm with network routing weighted by
travel time rather than distance, allowing the inclusion of
travel impedances and restrictions. Quickest routing was ap-
plied because the shortest route by distance may not nec-
essarily be the quickest traversable route because a shorter
path may be more weighted due to a restriction. For ex-
ample, a length of arterial road with a lower UK standard
speed restriction of 20 mph (32.2 km h−1) may be traversed
more quickly than a longer route such as a motorway with
a UK standard speed restriction of 70 mph (112.7 km h−1).
Routing based on Dijkstra’s algorithm was chosen due to
the algorithm being a computationally efficient and widely
accepted method of solving vehicle routing problems and
conducting network analyses (Sniedovich, 2010). Further-
more, the method was easily interfaced with the GIS frame-
work, allowing the implementation of weighted restrictions
and impedance data contained within the ITN metadata the
network analyses conducted.
All network analyses took into account ITN road restric-
tion and impedances specifically for emergency vehicles, as
defined by the UK government’s Traffic Signs Regulations
and General Directions Act (2002). Vehicle qualifier infor-
mation, metadata imbedded within the ITN dataset, which
indicates whether a restriction or impedance applied to a
Figure 4. Fluvial flood restrictions under (a) 1 in 20-year, (b) 1 in
100-year and (c) 1 in 1000-year scenarios.
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specific vehicle depending on its use, load and type (e.g.
taxi, bus, wide-load heavy goods vehicle, emergency vehi-
cles, hazardous or dangerous loads), was set to “emergency
vehicles” to reflect the motoring regulations that emergency
vehicles are exempt from during blue-light response.
Basic origin of destination “A-to-B” routing between two
points and response zone calculation was undertaken for key
fire and rescue and ambulance nodes identified using the Na-
tional Receptors Database. To calculate A-to-B routing, an
origin node (A) was identified (i.e. fire and rescue station)
and a destination node (B) was highlighted where an emer-
gency vehicle may have to attend, i.e. an evacuation centre
where affected persons would be gathered in the event of an
emergency. Quickest routing between both points was then
calculated to give a journey duration under normal no-flood
conditions. Flood restrictions were then overlain over these
routes and routing was recalculated to understand the specific
impact of flooding on an origin-to-destination routing.
Next, to calculate polygon response zones of emergency
responders, relevant nodes (i.e. fire and rescue stations, am-
bulance stations and hospitals) identified from the National
Receptors Dataset were treated as “facilities” within an Ar-
cGIS Network Analyst framework. Using these facilities as
starting points for vehicle routing, polygon response zones
highlighting all road network locations lying within a 10 min
(fire and rescue) or 8 min (ambulance) radius were calculated
for each individual station, based on legislated response time
frames for “Red 1” high-priority incidents. Individual sta-
tion service polygon areas were then combined and overlain
to visualise and evaluate the zonal emergency service cover-
age for the whole city under unimpeded no-flood conditions.
Flood restriction data for surface water and fluvial flood sce-
narios could then be input into Network Analyst and the re-
sponse polygons could be recalculated for different magni-
tude surface water and fluvial flood scenarios to understand
the impact of flooding on emergency response.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Origin–destination routing
Using a simple origin-to-destination routing, a route be-
tween the Western Fire and Rescue Station and St. Andrew’s
Methodist Church, an evacuation centre within a close prox-
imity to the Western Fire and Rescue Station, was calcu-
lated. Figure 5a highlights the modelled quickest route under
normal conditions when no flood restrictions were present,
demonstrating that fire and rescue services responding from
the Western station would be able to reach the destination
within a 5 min time frame, travelling a distance of 4.6 km
(2.86 miles). However, when flood restrictions derived from
a 1 in 100-year fluvial flood event were integrated into the
model, journey travel times were shown to increase to 8 min
(+60 %; Fig. 5b) under a “flood-informed” scenario, where
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Figure 5. Quickest routing between the Western Fire and Res-
cue Station and St. Andrew’s Methodist Church (evacuation cen-
tre, 300-person capacity) under (a) normal conditions and high
(> 100 year) fluvial flood risk scenarios. (b) A prepared and “in-
formed” scenario where first responders are aware of network re-
strictions before responding, whereas (c) shows a “uniformed” sce-
nario where impassable floodwaters are encountered by responders
en route.
responders are prepared and informed of network restrictions
before responding and are able to plan an alternative route
before leaving the station, and 15 min (+200 %; Fig. 5c)
under an uninformed scenario, where impassable floodwa-
ters are encountered by responders en route. This demon-
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Figure 6. City accessibility (within 10 min) for fire and rescue service stations under normal no-flood conditions.
strates the impact that flood events may have upon origin-to-
destination routing for emergency responders, as legislated
response times may be unachievable under potential flood
situations, which may limit the efficiency of emergency re-
sponders traversing a disrupted road network, resulting in af-
fected individuals being at greater risk (Arkell and Darch,
2006). Furthermore, the importance of preparedness is crit-
ical because emergency responders may be able to respond
more rapidly if up-to-date information on the extent of flood-
related network restrictions is available.
3.1.1 Zonal response: no-flood conditions
The network analysis undertaken suggests that Leicestershire
Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) would be able to reach
100 % of the city road network within 10 min when operat-
ing under normal conditions (i.e. no flooding or disruptions
present), meeting the 10 min legislative time frame (Fig. 6).
Furthermore, significant areas of the city are shown to be
within a 10 min response zone from one or more fire and
rescue stations as there are numerous areas across the city
where overlap in station coverage exists. This indicates that
the fire and rescue stations are strategically placed to max-
imise station coverage, and some contingency overlap exists
when operating under optimal conditions to ensure resilient
operation.
The response zones for the East Midlands Ambulance
Service (EMAS) for an 8 min-or-less (for immediately life-
threatening incidents) scenario returned similar findings.
Under normal conditions when no flood restrictions were
present, it was predicted that 89 % of the city would be reach-
able within 8 min or less (Table 1; Fig. 7). Areas that were
predicted to be unreachable within an 8 min time frame were
mostly situated around the city boundary. However, unlike
the fire and rescue service, which is more dependent on re-
maining at their stations between incidents (e.g. due to re-
quiring different personal protective equipment, depending
on the incident, and because of the size of the emergency
vehicle), ambulance services are more mobile in their oper-
ations and have strategic standby points that they are able
to occupy between incidents, based on statistical and historic
incident records, often only returning to the ambulance depot
at the end of a shift.
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Figure 7. Accessibility of the city (8 min) for ambulance service stations operating under normal no-flood conditions.
Table 1. Percentage of area accessible to fire and rescue and ambulance service stations under normal and flood scenarios.
Flood scenarios Fire and rescue service Ambulance service
Accessible in 10 min Inaccessible Accessible in 8 min Inaccessible
No flood 100 % 0 % 88.9 % 0 %
1 in 20-year SW 66.5 % 6.0 % 50.7 % 2.6 %
1 in 100-year SW 39.8 % 12.7 % 39.8 % 12.5 %
1 in 1000-year SW 26.2 % 31.0 % 26.8 % 30.9 %
1 in 20-year Flv 97.6 % 1.9 % 84.1 % 3.5 %
1 in 100-year Flv 96.2 % 1.9 % 82.9 % 3.5 %
1 in 1000-year Flv 74.3 % 13.8 % 56.0 % 13.1 %
NB “SW” is surface water flooding scenarios; “Flv” is fluvial flooding scenarios.
3.1.2 Impact of surface water flooding
Fire and rescue service
When restrictions derived from the 20-year surface water
flood scenario were incorporated into the model, the fire and
rescue service was shown to experience a 34 % reduction in
service coverage, resulting in 66 % of the road network being
accessible in 10 min or less (Table 1; Fig. 8a). This reduction
in service coverage appears to be due to difficulties in ac-
cess due to a decrease in the road network connectivity along
primary, high-hierarchy road linkages (i.e. A-roads), which
are intended to provide large-scale transport links within or
between areas, as opposed to lower-hierarchy arterial roads,
which are intended for local traffic to smaller housing estates
(Department of Transport, 2012). Large parts of the south-
west of the city appear to be inaccessible within a legislated
10 min time frame due to key access roads (e.g. A5460, A563
and M1 motorway) surrounding the Southern Fire and Res-
cue Station experiencing floodwaters overlaying the ITN, re-
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Figure 8. City-scale accessibility (within a 10 min time frame) for fire and rescue service stations: (a) 1 in 20-year, (b) 1 in 100-year and (c) 1
in 1000-year surface water flooding scenarios. New Parks Lane, referred to in the text, is highlighted in the rectangle in Fig. 8a. See Fig. 6
for key.
Figure 9. The Eastern Fire and Rescue Station during a 1 in 100-
year flood event shows the surrounding roads experiencing inunda-
tion, predominantly surrounding Willow Brook (centre). The green
line indicates the accessible road network without mitigation mea-
sures. Floodwaters surrounding Willow Brook were removed at the
Humberstone Road intercept because a large bridge passed over
the brook. Floodwaters blocking access to the A6030 were also re-
moved since these would likely be pumped.
sulting in a reduction in service coverage (Fig. 10a). Addi-
tionally, ITN blockages along primary access roads, includ-
ing New Parks Way (A563) by Hinkley Road roundabout and
the A47, result in the Western and Central Fire and Rescue
stations becoming unable to access areas located within the
south-west of the city. Moreover, 6 % of the city area was
predicted to be completely inaccessible or “islanded”, either
due to floodwater occupying the road network directly or due
to zones of the city being isolated and surrounded entirely by
floodwaters.
Under a 1 in 100-year surface water flood scenario, the
modelling suggested that 40 % of the city would be accessi-
ble within 10 min and 13 % of the city would be completely
Figure 10. The Southern Fire and Rescue Station during a 1 in 100-
year flood event shows that the station is directly at risk of flooding
and if sufficient mitigation measures are not taken during a flood
of similar or greater magnitude, functioning of the station could be
compromised.
inaccessible (Table 1; Fig. 8b). The analysis conducted was
based on a best-case scenario, assuming that localised pump-
ing of floodwaters would be conducted at the Eastern and
Southern Fire and Rescue stations since these stations would
be directly or indirectly affected by a flood event of this
magnitude; the Eastern Fire and Rescue Station may expe-
rience disruptions in service because of difficulties in access-
ing the key access routes, Humberstone Road (A47) and the
A6030, due to the surrounding road network being inundated
by floodwaters (Fig. 9), while the Southern Fire and Res-
cue Station may experience direct flooding if floodwaters are
not managed (Fig. 10). In the analysis, smaller restrictions
surrounding these stations were removed, assuming that the
fire and rescue stations would focus resources on ensuring
that these facilities were functioning efficiently. However, it
is possible that the Eastern and Southern Fire and Rescue sta-
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Figure 11. City-scale accessibility (within an 8 min time frame) for ambulance service stations under (a) 1 in 20-year, (b) 1 in 100-year
and (c) 1 in 1000-year surface water flooding scenarios. The key access roads referred to in the text are highlighted in the rectangles in
Fig. 11a. Refer to Fig. 7 for key.
tions could be rendered inoperable under a 1 in 100-year sur-
face water flood event if sufficient mitigation measures were
not conducted.
Under the most extreme 1000-year surface water flood
scenario, the model predicted that almost three-quarters of
the city would be inaccessible to the fire and rescue service
within a 10 min time frame, with 26 % of the city being ac-
cessible by the fire and rescue station in under 10 min (Ta-
ble 1; Fig. 8c). Additionally, 31 % of the city was predicted to
be completely inaccessible to the fire and rescue service us-
ing the city’s road network. Therefore, other means of trans-
port (e.g. foot, boat or helicopter) would be required to access
large areas of the city. Moreover, under this extreme flood
scenario, the Eastern and Southern Fire and Rescue stations
would be fully compromised by floodwaters and would be re-
quired to divert their operations and resources to alternative
stations across the city.
The model also predicts that there would be no overlap
in fire and rescue station coverage during a 1 in 1000-year
surface water flood event and that many vulnerable parts of
the city, including the main hospital (Leicester Royal Infir-
mary), would be either directly inundated by floodwaters or
inaccessible due to key access routes throughout the city ex-
periencing network restrictions.
Ambulance service
When flood restrictions were introduced into the ambulance
service response model, high-priority response coverage in
8 min or less was shown to decrease in relation to an increase
in flood magnitude, similar to the fire and rescue service re-
sponse. Over half of the city (51 %) was projected to be ac-
cessible in 8 min or less under a 1 in 20-year surface water
flood scenario, 40 % under a 1 in 100-year scenario and 27 %
under a 1 in 1000-year scenario (Table 1; Fig. 11). Although
the east of the city surrounding Leicester General Hospi-
tal and Goodwood Ambulance Station appears to maintain
much of its accessibility, areas to the north and south of the
city become inaccessible during a 1 in 20-year flood event
due to flood restrictions causing a bottleneck and restricting
transit on a number of primary access roads throughout the
city, including Melton Road (A607), Aylestone Road (A426),
Welford Road (A5199) and Hinkley Road (A47).
Furthermore, areas of absolute inaccessibility were also
shown to correlate with flood magnitude. Under a no-flood
scenario, the entire city was accessible by road, while 2.6,
12.5 and 30.9 % of the city was shown to be inaccessible by
the ambulance service under 1 in 20-, 1 in 100- and 1 in 1000-
year surface water flood scenarios respectively (Table 1).
3.2 Impact of fluvial flooding
When compared to the surface water flood scenarios, inci-
dences of fluvial flooding within Leicester were shown to
have a minor impact on emergency response under the 1 in
20- (Fig. 12a) and 1 in 100-year (Fig. 12b) fluvial flooding
scenarios, with fire and rescue and ambulance service emer-
gency response only becoming significantly impacted under
an extreme 1 in 1000-year fluvial flood scenario (Fig. 12c).
This could be due to the large capacity of the River Soar and
associated tributaries passing through the city centre, which
were engineered into culverts and linear compound chan-
nels to convey floodwaters rapidly and efficiently, meaning
a large magnitude flood would be required to cause signifi-
cant disruption. Additionally, it is likely that the impacts of
fluvial flooding on emergency response are limited at lower
magnitudes when compared to surface water flood events
of similar magnitude. This is because the spatially concen-
trated footprint of fluvial flooding surrounds watercourses,
meaning disruptions are more confined and less widespread.
The assessment suggests that emergency responders operat-
ing within Leicester are resilient to fluvial flood events of
low to medium magnitude, with such events having lim-
ited impact on emergency response times and accessibility
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/17/1/2017/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 17, 1–16, 2017
12 D. Green et al.: City-scale accessibility of emergency responders operating during flood events
(a) (b) (c)
10 min response zones - Fire & rescue service (1 in 20-year fluvial) 10 min response zones - Fire & rescue service (1 in 100-year fluvial) 10 min response zones - Fire & rescue service (1 in 1000-year fluvial)
Figure 12. City-scale accessibility (within a 10 min time frame) for fire and rescue service stations under (a) 1 in 20-year, (b) 1 in 100-year
and (c) 1 in 1000-year fluvial flooding scenarios. Refer to the key in Fig. 6.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 13. City-scale accessibility (within an 8 min time frame) for ambulance service stations under (a) 1 in 20-year, (b) 1 in 100-year
and (c) 1 in 1000-year fluvial flooding scenarios. Key access roads referred to in the text are within grid reference E4 in (c).
across the city. However, the 1 in 1000-year (Fig. 12c) flu-
vial flood scenario was shown to significantly impact emer-
gency response and accessibility, with some stations becom-
ing compromised by floodwaters. The fire and rescue service
scenario suggested that the Eastern Fire and Rescue Station
would be severely impacted by fluvial flooding from Willow
Brook, resulting in the station only being able to respond to
localised incidents, similar to the situation depicted in Fig. 9.
Additionally, the ambulance service scenario suggested that
Leicester Royal Infirmary would be inundated by floodwa-
ters, rendering the hospital’s ambulance station inoperable,
and large areas in the north, north-east, south and south-east
of the city would become inaccessible within an 8 min re-
sponse time (Fig. 13). Furthermore, the 1 in 1000-year fluvial
flood scenarios show a partitioning of the city into two sep-
arately functioning entities divided into east and west along
the River Soar, where emergency resources would be unable
to be exchanged by road because of key access roads cross-
ing the River Soar (e.g. the A-roads surrounding Frog Island
are the A47, A50, A6) becoming blocked with floodwaters.
3.3 Temporal evolution of accessibility through a
surface water flood event
The sections above show a static representation of emergency
response under maximum flood depths. However, it is also
likely that the accessibility of emergency responders operat-
ing at a city scale during flood conditions may evolve through
the duration of a flood event. It is likely that accessibility will
change between 0 h, when no disruptions are present (i.e. no-
flood conditions), and the maximum extent of floodwaters
(outlined in the surface water flood scenarios above). There-
fore, emergency response accessibility may change over time
as the city’s road network is compromised.
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Figure 14. Combined ambulance service response zones during a 1 in 100-year surface water flood event. (a) No-flood conditions prior to
the flood event, (b) 0.25 h, (c) 1.0 h, (d) 2.0 h, (e) 3.0 h, (f) 4.0 h, (g) 5.0 h, (h) 6.0 h, at the end of the rainfall event and (i) static maximum
flood depths recorded during the event. Refer to key in Fig. 7. Please see the Supplement for an animated version of Fig. 14.
To further understand the temporal evolution of accessibil-
ity during a surface water flood event, the ambulance service
8 min response during a 1 in 100-year flood event was exam-
ined. Surface water flood depths were extracted at multiple
points in time throughout the flood event (namely 0, 0.25,
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 h and the maximum flood depths that were
recorded during the design rainfall event; Fig. 2). Next, sur-
face water flood depths were processed into flood restrictions
and inputted into the ambulance service response model. Fig-
ure 14 shows the temporal evolution of ambulance 8 min re-
sponse zones throughout a 1 in 100-year surface water flood
event.
Results from the temporal inundation modelling demon-
strate that the influence of flooding on emergency response is
dynamic through a surface water flood event. Rapid onset im-
pacts are witnessed within the first 15 min of the event, with
service coverage overlap within the city centre being shown
to reduce. Goodwood, Leicester Royal Infirmary, Gorse Hill
and Leicester General Hospital stations are all shown to
experience a reduction in their service areas, and overlap
between station coverage is shown to decrease very early
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on during the flood event. Notably, the model predicts that
inundation extent over the depth threshold value increases
(> 25 cm) dramatically between 1 and 2 h, affecting many of
the primary access routes around the city and causing ambu-
lance accessibility and service coverage overlap to decrease
considerably. Because surface water flood events are often
unpredictable and have short lead times, this highlights the
requirement for emergency responders to be aware and pre-
pared for rapid-onset flood events.
4 Conclusion
Under normal operating conditions, both emergency services
considered were shown to reach the majority of the city (100
and 89 % for fire and rescue services and ambulance ser-
vices respectively) within the legislated response times for
Red 1 incidents (8 or 10 min), suggesting that the stations
are strategically situated to provide efficient response dur-
ing an emergency. In addition, there is sufficient overlap in
the polygonal response zones of each emergency responder
station, indicating a degree of resilience if one station was
unable to respond due to being occupied with another emer-
gency situation. However, when surface water and fluvial
flood situations of different magnitudes are introduced into
the model, wider ramifications of localised flooding on city-
scale emergency response times become apparent. Specif-
ically, surface water flood mechanisms are shown to exert
significant disruption to emergency response due to floodwa-
ters (i) being spatially distributed and widespread across the
city; (ii) having areal extents and depths that are sufficient
to cause restrictions to road users, even at lower magnitudes,
and (iii) occupying many of the key access routes (i.e. pri-
mary A-roads) and critical areas needed to traverse the city
road network.
In contrast, the impacts of fluvial flooding on emergency
response are limited, especially for lower-magnitude events.
This is principally due to the spatially concentrated nature
of the fluvial inundation footprint in the city, and the large
channel capacity of the River Soar and its associated tribu-
taries. The River Soar running through the city centre was en-
gineered into a linear compound channel with a large channel
capacity, meaning that high flood flows are conveyed rapidly
and efficiently downstream and beyond the city boundaries.
Bridges and overpasses built over watercourses in the city
are generally higher than the bank full channel capacity, thus
allowing the transport network surrounding the River Soar
to continue to be operational under small to medium flood
events. Under fluvial flood conditions, the key risk to emer-
gency responders is the direct flooding of emergency respon-
der locations, resulting in the stations becoming inoperable.
This is apparent in the 1 in 1000-year flood scenario when the
Goodwood Ambulance Station and the Eastern Fire and Res-
cue Station become compromised by floodwaters (Figs. 12c
and 13c).
Findings suggest that it is important to ensure that pri-
mary access locations within the city road network, predom-
inantly the higher-hierarchy roads (e.g. A-roads identified in
the analyses above) are kept restriction free, and specific ef-
fort should be focused on ensuring that these locations do not
become blocked. Furthermore, the ambulance service should
ensure that they are situated at strategic stand-by points dur-
ing flood conditions to minimise the impact of a blocked road
network on delaying emergency response to vulnerable loca-
tions.
Although findings indicate that Leicester’s emergency ser-
vice could be under pressure during certain flood scenarios
when responding to high-priority incidents, the modelled re-
sponse times are considered conservative since congestion
and behavioural factors were not incorporated in the anal-
ysis. As such, travel times during flood events of the pre-
sented magnitudes may be greater and emergency responders
may encounter forms of disruption that the model is unable
to represent. Further work could seek to incorporate traf-
fic modelling and consider human behaviour, although this
may prove difficult to assess without congestion data avail-
able during observed flood events. Additionally, the analy-
sis conducted does not consider future climatic changes in
precipitation regimes that may result in the occurrence of
more frequent and severe flood events resulting in a more
impacted emergency response (Wilby et al., 2008; Whitfield
2012; Kendon et al., 2014; Watts et al., 2015). Moreover, al-
though the use of accessibility maps based on Environment
Agency and local council flood hazard return periods can
be useful, particularly for planning purposes, their utility in
flood emergencies can be limited due the spatial and tem-
poral heterogeneity of rainfall distribution, which may dif-
fer between flood events. Further study may be directed at
coupling nowcast meteorological data (e.g. radar, rain gauge
or river flow data) with city-scale hydrodynamic inundation
models to provide real-time flood restriction data for the net-
work analysis framework. This could be used to inform op-
erational response and decision making during actual flood
events. Additionally, future work could be undertaken to as-
sess the impact of flood events (or other natural hazards,
such as tsunamis, landslides, wildfires, bridge closures or
collapses, etc.) on vulnerable infrastructure nodes (such as
emergency centres or nursing homes) to develop contingency
plans and/or analyse site preparedness for flooding (Liu et
al., 2016). Although vulnerability analyses were conducted
as part of this study using care homes as indicators of high
densities of vulnerable persons, the data could only be com-
municated internally to project partners due to confidential-
ity of data. Thus, vulnerability analyses have been excluded
from this paper, but they offer an effective method of com-
municating indirect flood risk to vulnerable people and loca-
tions.
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5 Data availability
The Ordnance Survey ITN dataset used to represent the trans-
port network in the modelling framework and the base map-
ping layers used in this study were downloaded through
the Edina Digimap (2016) data repository (https://digimap.
edina.ac.uk/os).
Flood restriction data inputted into the Network Analyst
model can be obtained from the UK Government (2016)
data repository (https://flood-warning-information.service.
gov.uk/long-term-flood-risk/map?map=Reservoirs). High-
resolution surface water flood outputs and associated files
(e.g. input precipitation, distributed roughness data, national
receptors database) can be requested for the city of Leices-
ter (Leicester City Council, 2012) (http://www.leicester.
gov.uk/media/178251/swmp-main-report.pdf), but similar
UK-wide surface water maps are freely available from the
the UK Government (2016) data repository.
The Supplement related to this article is available online
at doi:10.5194/nhess-17-1-2017-supplement.
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